Why Modi Government Engaged Pakistan in Secrecy

Prime Minister Narendra Modi & his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif meeting in Paris
The outcome of the Bangkok NSA-level
 talks underscores that Pakistan has got exactly what it wanted -- talks
 at different levels, talks on Kashmir, talks on mutual concerns 
regarding terrorism, talks on ceasefire on the border. What if any has 
been India’s gains remains unexplained, says Ambassador M K Bhadra 
kumar.
There can be no two opinions that the resumption of talks between India 
and Pakistan is always a welcome development. India’s obdurate stance on
 dialogue had become unsustainable.
The Indian stance on talks with Pakistan, which was forcefully 
articulated by none other than External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj 
in August in a memorable press conference in Delhi, had completely 
collapsed.
However, if the Indian public tends to see the meeting between the 
national security advisors of the two countries that took place in 
Bangkok on Sunday as a grand betrayal, the government can only blame 
itself.
The government made no effort to take the public into confidence 
following the 167-second meeting between the two prime ministers in 
Paris over a week ago to put across the point of view that a pressing 
need has arisen to re-engage Pakistan.
At a minimum, Delhi could have avoided the shroud of secrecy beneath the
 four-hour long engagement in Bangkok yesterday in a “candid, 
constructive and constructive atmosphere”. It is all too funny for 
words.
What explains the need for such cloak-and-dagger Kissinger-style 
diplomacy? Was it to cover up the dramatic U-turn in the government’s 
Pakistan policy?
One would like to believe that Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself had a
 profound rethink and decided that it is in the national interest to 
resume the dialogue with Pakistan. 
But, then, the spin being given to the Bangkok meeting by government 
sources is dripping with sophistry. It is pathetic to hear the spin that
 while the Kashmir issue came up during the Bangkok meeting, it was only
 about the ‘law and order’ part of the issue and not the ‘political 
part’.
The public expects and deserves a credible explanation. To be sure, the 
government can make a convincing case to explain to the public that a 
fundamental rethink in the country’s Pakistan policy has become 
necessary and unavoidable.
Any number of convincing reasons can be advanced to explain why India 
will be far better off without carrying the Albatross of the Kashmir 
issue, without the border tensions, without having to live under the 
shadow of terrorism.
The emergent new Cold War tensions and a strong likelihood of South Asia
 becoming a major theatre where big-power rivalries play out; the 
fragile regional security scenario; the spectre of the Islamic State 
haunting the region; the Afghan endgame; the imperatives of regional 
cooperation for India as an emerging power -- all these are compelling 
reasons why India ought to remain engaged with Pakistan in the present 
fluid climate of regional and international politics.
The country knows that a reintegration of the Taliban with the 
mainstream Afghan national life is what the international community 
demands today. On the other hand, it also knows that Pakistan today 
cannot pose any real threat to India and is focused largely on its own 
internal problems.
Clearly, our ‘containment strategy’ against Pakistan has not worked. 
Indian diplomacy has failed to isolate Pakistan in the world community.
On the contrary, Pakistan has successfully projected itself as a 
reasonable interlocutor, open to dialogue with India without 
pre-conditions to resolve differences peacefully through discussions, 
and has been far more optimal than India in the pursuit of a 
multi-vector foreign policy, which is attuned to the multipolar world.
In sum, what India needs is indeed a leap of faith in its Pakistan 
policy so that an uninterruptible engagement with that country becomes 
possible.
Modi is likely to visit Pakistan in November next year. Sufficient 
ground can be covered in the 11-month period ahead so that Modi’s 
Pakistan visit becomes a landmark event in the history and politics of 
the subcontinent.
Of course, it is a daunting challenge to resolve the longstanding 
differences with Pakistan unless there is a national consensus behind 
it. The best hope, therefore, is that Modi has girded up his loins 
to marginalize the “hawks” in his own camp, and in a chastened mood 
after the crushing defeat in the Bihar state elections, proposes to turn
 a new leaf.
But, then, things are not as simple as they might seem. The point is, 
the Modi government is entrapped in its own legacy. The majority opinion
 in the country favors normalisation with Pakistan, while it is the 
government’s “natural allies” who are clamouring for Hindu rashtra, 
Akhand Bharat, annexation of the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and the 
Northern Areas and such other bizarre ideas.
Unless these “natural allies” are reined in, it becomes problematic for 
the Modi government to pursue a consistent policy aimed at normalisation
 of India’s relations with Pakistan.
All in all, the secretive air about the scheduling of the Bangkok 
meeting and the laboured explanations since being given to it engender 
the uneasy feeling that the government remains a prisoner of its 
hardline constituency of militant nationalism.
In the absence of any rational explanation, the only conclusion one can 
draw is that the government may be acting under international pressure 
-- plainly put, Modi may have caved in under pressure from the US and 
simply going through the motions of engagement with Pakistan.
However, the great difficulty with such an explanation is that if it is 
indeed the case, the government is once again lurching toward an 
engagement with Pakistan without a coherent agenda or ‘big picture’ in 
view.
The danger here is that such on-again, off-again engagements with an 
adversarial power like Pakistan cannot have a happy ending. This fresh 
splurge in “constructive engagement” of Pakistan without a coherent 
agenda and a big picture in mind -- and simply to please Barack Obama or
 David Cameron -- can prove a costly misadventure, because, make no 
mistake, Islamabad knows precisely what it wants and it has not budged 
an inch from the position it took in August.
The widespread feeling in Pakistan is that normalisation with India will
 have to wait for the post-Modi era. If anything, Pakistan’s position 
has only hardened since August.
According to the grapevine, Islamabad plainly ignored Modi’s repeated 
overtures in September for a meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, 
before finally condescending to the 167-second meeting and the handshake
 in Paris -- and that, too, only after the visits by Prime Minister 
Sharif and army chief Gen Raheel Sharif to the US, which shored up 
American support for Pakistan’s core concerns such as talks with India 
on Kashmir, “strategic balance” in South Asia, “mutual concerns” with 
India regarding terrorism, peace and tranquility on the border, etc.
The outcome of the Bangkok talks underscores that Pakistan has got 
exactly what it wanted -- talks at different levels, talks on Kashmir, 
talks on mutual concerns regarding terrorism, talks on ceasefire on the 
border. What if any has been India’s gains remains unexplained.
Someone in the government should throw light on this area of darkness.




        


        




























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